Rewarding the Top: Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians

Lene Holm Pedersen; Jens Olav Dahlgaard; Rasmus Tue Pedersen

doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12146

Rewarding the Top: Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians

Lene Holm Pedersen^*, Jens Olav Dahlgaard, Rasmus Tue Pedersen

^*Corresponding author for this work

Abstract

The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.

Original language	English
Article number	2
Journal	Scandinavian Political Studies
Volume	42
Issue number	2
Pages (from-to)	118-137
Number of pages	20
ISSN	0080-6757
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12146
Publication status	Published - 27 Jun 2019

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title = "Rewarding the Top: Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians",

abstract = "The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians{\textquoteright} pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.",

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AU - Pedersen, Rasmus Tue

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N2 - The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.

AB - The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.

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Rewarding the Top: Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians

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