TY - JOUR
T1 - Rewarding the Top
T2 - Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians
AU - Pedersen, Lene Holm
AU - Dahlgaard, Jens Olav
AU - Pedersen, Rasmus Tue
PY - 2019/6/27
Y1 - 2019/6/27
N2 - The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.
AB - The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.
U2 - 10.1111/1467-9477.12146
DO - 10.1111/1467-9477.12146
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85068002083
SN - 0080-6757
VL - 42
SP - 118
EP - 137
JO - Scandinavian Political Studies
JF - Scandinavian Political Studies
IS - 2
M1 - 2
ER -