TY - JOUR
T1 - Can We Comply with the Ideal of Value-Freedom? A Reply to Miller’s Critique of the Ideal of Value-Freedom in Science
AU - Djørup, Stine
AU - Hallsson, Bjørn Gunnar
AU - Kappel, Klemens
PY - 2019/3/1
Y1 - 2019/3/1
N2 - The purpose of this paper is to discuss Miller’s recent claim that 1) the ideal of value-freedom is implausible because evidence from experimental psychology reveals how scientific reasoning is value-laden and biased, and 2) that the ideal of value-freedom requires the exercise of complex conceptual distinctions that scientists cannot make. According to Miller, the ideal of value-freedom, therefore, violates the principle that ought implies can. The paper replies 1) that experimental psychology may show that science is value-laden in some sense, yet this does not imply that the ideal of value-freedom should be rejected as unachievable. This is because scientists can reduce the influence from non-epistemic values, inter alia, by employing debiasing techniques and other scientific procedures. The paper also replies that 2) the ideal of value-freedom in science does not violate the principle that ought implies can because scientists do not seem to need a philosophical vocabulary in order to make the relevant distinctions between different epistemic attitudes.
AB - The purpose of this paper is to discuss Miller’s recent claim that 1) the ideal of value-freedom is implausible because evidence from experimental psychology reveals how scientific reasoning is value-laden and biased, and 2) that the ideal of value-freedom requires the exercise of complex conceptual distinctions that scientists cannot make. According to Miller, the ideal of value-freedom, therefore, violates the principle that ought implies can. The paper replies 1) that experimental psychology may show that science is value-laden in some sense, yet this does not imply that the ideal of value-freedom should be rejected as unachievable. This is because scientists can reduce the influence from non-epistemic values, inter alia, by employing debiasing techniques and other scientific procedures. The paper also replies that 2) the ideal of value-freedom in science does not violate the principle that ought implies can because scientists do not seem to need a philosophical vocabulary in order to make the relevant distinctions between different epistemic attitudes.
U2 - 10.1080/21550085.2019.1581414
DO - 10.1080/21550085.2019.1581414
M3 - Tidsskriftartikel
SN - 2155-0085
JO - Ethics, Policy & Environment
JF - Ethics, Policy & Environment
ER -