Can We Comply with the Ideal of Value-Freedom? A Reply to Miller’s Critique of the Ideal of Value-Freedom in Science

Stine Djørup; Bjørn Gunnar Hallsson; Klemens Kappel

doi:10.1080/21550085.2019.1581414

Can We Comply with the Ideal of Value-Freedom? A Reply to Miller’s Critique of the Ideal of Value-Freedom in Science

Stine Djørup, Bjørn Gunnar Hallsson, Klemens Kappel

Department of Communication

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to discuss Miller’s recent claim that 1) the ideal of value-freedom is implausible because evidence from experimental psychology reveals how scientific reasoning is value-laden and biased, and 2) that the ideal of value-freedom requires the exercise of complex conceptual distinctions that scientists cannot make. According to Miller, the ideal of value-freedom, therefore, violates the principle that ought implies can. The paper replies 1) that experimental psychology may show that science is value-laden in some sense, yet this does not imply that the ideal of value-freedom should be rejected as unachievable. This is because scientists can reduce the influence from non-epistemic values, inter alia, by employing debiasing techniques and other scientific procedures. The paper also replies that 2) the ideal of value-freedom in science does not violate the principle that ought implies can because scientists do not seem to need a philosophical vocabulary in order to make the relevant distinctions between different epistemic attitudes.

Original language	Danish
Journal	Ethics, Policy & Environment
ISSN	2155-0085
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2019.1581414
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2019

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Can We Comply with the Ideal of Value Freedom A Reply to Miller s Critique of the Ideal of Value Freedom in ScienceFinal published version, 910 KB

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title = "Can We Comply with the Ideal of Value-Freedom? A Reply to Miller{\textquoteright}s Critique of the Ideal of Value-Freedom in Science",

abstract = "The purpose of this paper is to discuss Miller{\textquoteright}s recent claim that 1) the ideal of value-freedom is implausible because evidence from experimental psychology reveals how scientific reasoning is value-laden and biased, and 2) that the ideal of value-freedom requires the exercise of complex conceptual distinctions that scientists cannot make. According to Miller, the ideal of value-freedom, therefore, violates the principle that ought implies can. The paper replies 1) that experimental psychology may show that science is value-laden in some sense, yet this does not imply that the ideal of value-freedom should be rejected as unachievable. This is because scientists can reduce the influence from non-epistemic values, inter alia, by employing debiasing techniques and other scientific procedures. The paper also replies that 2) the ideal of value-freedom in science does not violate the principle that ought implies can because scientists do not seem to need a philosophical vocabulary in order to make the relevant distinctions between different epistemic attitudes.",

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