Abstract
In this article, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in social research. The partial analysis shows that nonepistemic values have both required and permissible roles to play during this phase of research. By appeal to the analysis, I reject the ideal of value-free science as applied to qualitative data collection, and I demonstrate why two alternative ideals should likewise be dismissed as standards for values in qualitative data collection. Also, I briefly discuss the extent to which the partial analysis carries over to quantitative data collection in social research.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 85 |
Issue number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 144-163 |
Number of pages | 20 |
ISSN | 0031-8248 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jan 2018 |