Abstract
I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Experimental Ethics : Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy |
| Editors | Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch, Matthias Uhl |
| Place of Publication | London |
| Publisher | Palgrave Macmillan |
| Publication date | 23 Sept 2014 |
| Pages | 80-93 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781137409799 |
| Publication status | Published - 23 Sept 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |