Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

Ezio Di Nucci

Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

1 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Titel	Experimental Ethics : Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy
Redaktører	Christoph Lütge, Hannes Rusch, Matthias Uhl
Udgivelsessted	London
Forlag	Palgrave Macmillan
Publikationsdato	23 sep. 2014
Sider	80-93
ISBN (Trykt)	9781137409799
Status	Udgivet - 23 sep. 2014
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

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http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/experimental-ethics-christoph-luetge/?K=9781137409799

Citationsformater

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Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

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