The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas

TY - JOUR

T1 - The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas

AU - Høffding, Simon

AU - Krueger, Joel William

PY - 2016/1/1

Y1 - 2016/1/1

N2 - In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.

AB - In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1355-8250

VL - 23

SP - 158

EP - 178

JO - Journal of Consciousness Studies

JF - Journal of Consciousness Studies

IS - 1-2

ER -