The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas

Simon Høffding; Joel William Krueger

The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas

Abstract

n this commentary, we engage with Almaas's contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a 'minimal self'. We attempt to clarify Almaas's claims about 'phenomenological givens' and 'non-dual', 'pure consciousness', and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to conscious-ness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Journal of Consciousness Studies
Vol/bind	23
Udgave nummer	1-2
Sider (fra-til)	158-178
Antal sider	21
ISSN	1355-8250
Status	Udgivet - 1 jan. 2016

Citationsformater

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title = "The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas",

abstract = "In this commentary, we engage with Almaas{\textquoteright}s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a {\textquoteleft}minimal self{\textquoteright}. We attempt to clarify Almaas{\textquoteright}s claims about {\textquoteleft}phenomenological givens{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}non-dual{\textquoteright}, {\textquoteleft}pure consciousness{\textquoteright}, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.",

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N2 - In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.

AB - In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.

M3 - Journal article

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EP - 178

JO - Journal of Consciousness Studies

JF - Journal of Consciousness Studies

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The First-Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas

Abstract

Fingeraftryk

Citationsformater