Abstract
This chapter first outlines a view regarding the relationship between consciousness, selfconsciousness, and a minimal notion of self that is widespread in the phenomenological tradition. It then discusses some of the motivations behind this proposal, and then in the main part of the chapter critically engages with various objections that have recently been raised against this view by Albahari and Dreyfus. Discussing these objections will allow for an important clarification of the view defended here. Also discussed are some of the semantic and metaphysical disagreements that separate defenders and deniers of self, concluding with some reflections regarding the relation between self and diachronic unity.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Self, No Self? : Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions |
| Editors | Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, Dan Zahavi |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Publication date | 1 Dec 2010 |
| Pages | 56-78 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199593804 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2010 |