The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications

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Abstract

This chapter first outlines a view regarding the relationship between consciousness, selfconsciousness, and a minimal notion of self that is widespread in the phenomenological tradition. It then discusses some of the motivations behind this proposal, and then in the main part of the chapter critically engages with various objections that have recently been raised against this view by Albahari and Dreyfus. Discussing these objections will allow for an important clarification of the view defended here. Also discussed are some of the semantic and metaphysical disagreements that separate defenders and deniers of self, concluding with some reflections regarding the relation between self and diachronic unity.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelSelf, No Self? : Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions
RedaktørerMark Siderits, Evan Thompson, Dan Zahavi
Antal sider23
ForlagOxford University Press
Publikationsdato1 dec. 2010
Sider56-78
ISBN (Trykt)9780199593804
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 1 dec. 2010

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