TY - JOUR
T1 - Sin taxes, paternalism, and justifiability to all: Can paternalistic taxes be justified on a public reason-sensitive account?
AU - Nielsen, Morten Ebbe Juul
AU - Jensen, Jørgen Dejgård
PY - 2016/3/1
Y1 - 2016/3/1
N2 - Sin taxes, or sumptuary taxes, are instruments meant to reduce the consumption of some product, normally for the reason that (over-) consumption of the product is unhealthy. The most reasonable justification for such a policy (setting aside utilitarian concerns, at least) is that "it is good for you"; which means basically a paternalist justification. From the economic point of view, the price sensitivity of consumption depends on the character of the good, and how substitutable it is with other goods. Empirical studies suggest that price sensitivity in consumption response is relatively large for low-income individuals, which might yield support for paternalistic interventions-this, however, tends to be a too simplistic picture due to substitution effects, which depend on the character of the goods. Individuals in low-income groups will also face a relatively large economic cost in case of sin taxes. The net distributional effect of sin taxes is an empirical question, and existing studies on distributional impacts of health-motivated food and beverage taxation show somewhat mixed results in terms of the cost/utility distribution across income classes, but the redistributive effects between low- and high-income consumers do not appear to be dramatic, and hence do not undermine the paternalistic rationale for such sin taxes in the considered cases. Some of the normative concerns are partly alleviated by the findings. Some sin taxes do seem to have beneficent impact on health, and it is not necessarily the case that the worse off do not benefit from such policies. However, some normative concerns remain, even on the assumption that sin taxes can be fairly efficient. (i) If justification (of principles or their concomitant policies) should address the individuals affected, then the paternalist justification is likely to misfire as regards at least some persons: they stand not to be benefitted, only burdened. One might say that this might be simply a negative factor to be weighed against the potential benefits; however, from the point of view of justification or legitimacy on a public reason-sensitive account, the paternalist justification-"it is good for you"-does not apply to those that are only burdened and not benefitted. Other justifications need to be invoked, and we have argued that the reversibility constraint on proposals and reasonable rejections of proposals at least sometimes can justify policies to those who are not benefitted. (ii) We have argued that a modest concern for egalitarian values is compatible with public reason-sensitive accounts. However, the regressive character of most forms of sin taxes might constitute a normative problem when seen against egalitarian values because the worse off are generally relatively more burdened by sin taxes. (iii) When we move from a singular focus on impact on persons' health, a string of other factors relevant for well-being comes to the fore, such as the hedonic and sociocultural value of foods and beverages that might be termed "unhealthy," unnecessary worry or misconceptions about one's own health, stigmatization, and so on. These negative impacts on individual wellbeing also count against the plausibility of the paternalist justification of sin taxes on foods and drinks. To be justified, paternalist initiatives should be good for wellbeing, not just good for health.
AB - Sin taxes, or sumptuary taxes, are instruments meant to reduce the consumption of some product, normally for the reason that (over-) consumption of the product is unhealthy. The most reasonable justification for such a policy (setting aside utilitarian concerns, at least) is that "it is good for you"; which means basically a paternalist justification. From the economic point of view, the price sensitivity of consumption depends on the character of the good, and how substitutable it is with other goods. Empirical studies suggest that price sensitivity in consumption response is relatively large for low-income individuals, which might yield support for paternalistic interventions-this, however, tends to be a too simplistic picture due to substitution effects, which depend on the character of the goods. Individuals in low-income groups will also face a relatively large economic cost in case of sin taxes. The net distributional effect of sin taxes is an empirical question, and existing studies on distributional impacts of health-motivated food and beverage taxation show somewhat mixed results in terms of the cost/utility distribution across income classes, but the redistributive effects between low- and high-income consumers do not appear to be dramatic, and hence do not undermine the paternalistic rationale for such sin taxes in the considered cases. Some of the normative concerns are partly alleviated by the findings. Some sin taxes do seem to have beneficent impact on health, and it is not necessarily the case that the worse off do not benefit from such policies. However, some normative concerns remain, even on the assumption that sin taxes can be fairly efficient. (i) If justification (of principles or their concomitant policies) should address the individuals affected, then the paternalist justification is likely to misfire as regards at least some persons: they stand not to be benefitted, only burdened. One might say that this might be simply a negative factor to be weighed against the potential benefits; however, from the point of view of justification or legitimacy on a public reason-sensitive account, the paternalist justification-"it is good for you"-does not apply to those that are only burdened and not benefitted. Other justifications need to be invoked, and we have argued that the reversibility constraint on proposals and reasonable rejections of proposals at least sometimes can justify policies to those who are not benefitted. (ii) We have argued that a modest concern for egalitarian values is compatible with public reason-sensitive accounts. However, the regressive character of most forms of sin taxes might constitute a normative problem when seen against egalitarian values because the worse off are generally relatively more burdened by sin taxes. (iii) When we move from a singular focus on impact on persons' health, a string of other factors relevant for well-being comes to the fore, such as the hedonic and sociocultural value of foods and beverages that might be termed "unhealthy," unnecessary worry or misconceptions about one's own health, stigmatization, and so on. These negative impacts on individual wellbeing also count against the plausibility of the paternalist justification of sin taxes on foods and drinks. To be justified, paternalist initiatives should be good for wellbeing, not just good for health.
U2 - 10.1111/josp.12139
DO - 10.1111/josp.12139
M3 - Journal article
SN - 0047-2786
VL - 47
SP - 55
EP - 69
JO - Journal of Social Philosophy
JF - Journal of Social Philosophy
IS - 1
ER -
