Abstract
In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a 'shared goal'-a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations-then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are appropriate to realizing a goal with others rather than individually. By offering a counterexample, I show that the pattern of goal-relations and expectations specified by Butterfill cannot play this role. I then provide an appropriately conceptually and cognitively undemanding amendment with which the account can be saved.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue number | 258 |
| Pages (from-to) | 94-101 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| ISSN | 0031-8094 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2015 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Humanities
- Joint action
- plural activity
- shared goal
- mindreading
- social development
- Stephen Butterfill