Abstract
In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a 'shared goal'-a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations-then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are appropriate to realizing a goal with others rather than individually. By offering a counterexample, I show that the pattern of goal-relations and expectations specified by Butterfill cannot play this role. I then provide an appropriately conceptually and cognitively undemanding amendment with which the account can be saved.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Philosophical Quarterly |
Vol/bind | 65 |
Udgave nummer | 258 |
Sider (fra-til) | 94-101 |
Antal sider | 8 |
ISSN | 0031-8094 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1 jan. 2015 |
Emneord
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet