Abstract
Traditional "economic equivalence'' results, like the Ricardian equivalence proposition, define equivalence classes over exogenous policies. We derive "politico-economic equivalence" conditions that apply in environments where policy is endogenous and chosen sequentially. A policy regime and a state are equivalent to another such pair if both pairs give rise to the same allocation in politico-economic equilibrium. The equivalence conditions help to identify factors that render institutional change non-neutral and to construct politico-economic equilibria in new policy regimes. We exemplify their use in the context of several applications, relating to social security reform, tax-smoothing policies and measures to correct externalities.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Review of Economic Dynamics |
Volume | 18 |
Issue number | 4 |
Pages (from-to) | 843-862 |
Number of pages | 20 |
ISSN | 1094-2025 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2015 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Social Sciences
- Equivalence
- Politico-economic equilibrium
- Tax policy
- Government debt
- Social security reform