Abstract
Traditional "economic equivalence'' results, like the Ricardian equivalence proposition, define equivalence classes over exogenous policies. We derive "politico-economic equivalence" conditions that apply in environments where policy is endogenous and chosen sequentially. A policy regime and a state are equivalent to another such pair if both pairs give rise to the same allocation in politico-economic equilibrium. The equivalence conditions help to identify factors that render institutional change non-neutral and to construct politico-economic equilibria in new policy regimes. We exemplify their use in the context of several applications, relating to social security reform, tax-smoothing policies and measures to correct externalities.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Review of Economic Dynamics |
Vol/bind | 18 |
Udgave nummer | 4 |
Sider (fra-til) | 843-862 |
Antal sider | 20 |
ISSN | 1094-2025 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - okt. 2015 |
Emneord
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