Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Ola Andersson; Matteo M. Galizzi; Tim Hoppe; Sebastian Krantz; Karen van der Wiel; Erik Roland Wengström

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Ola Andersson, Matteo M. Galizzi, Tim Hoppe, Sebastian Krantz, Karen van der Wiel, Erik Roland Wengström

Department of Economics

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	108
Issue number	1
Pages (from-to)	16-18
Number of pages	3
ISSN	0165-1765
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011
Publication status	Published - Jul 2010

Keywords

Faculty of Social Sciences
communication in games
cheap talk

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10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

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title = "Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games",

abstract = "We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.",

keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, communication in games, cheap talk",

author = "Ola Andersson and Galizzi, {Matteo M.} and Tim Hoppe and Sebastian Krantz and {van der Wiel}, Karen and Wengstr{\"o}m, {Erik Roland}",

note = "JEL classification: C72, C91, D83",

year = "2010",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011",

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AU - Andersson, Ola

AU - Galizzi, Matteo M.

AU - Hoppe, Tim

AU - Krantz, Sebastian

AU - van der Wiel, Karen

AU - Wengström, Erik Roland

N1 - JEL classification: C72, C91, D83

PY - 2010/7

Y1 - 2010/7

N2 - We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

AB - We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - communication in games

KW - cheap talk

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 108

SP - 16

EP - 18

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1

ER -

Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Abstract

Keywords

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