Abstract
I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Philosophical Explorations |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 153-167 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| ISSN | 1386-9795 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2011 |