Perception and non-inferential knowledge of action

TY - JOUR

T1 - Perception and non-inferential knowledge of action

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2011/6

Y1 - 2011/6

N2 - I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential.

AB - I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her action perception can only play an enabling role (and no justificatory role) for the agent's knowledge and if perception has a justificatory role, then the agent's knowledge must be inferential.

U2 - 10.1080/13869795.2011.569746

DO - 10.1080/13869795.2011.569746

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1386-9795

VL - 14

SP - 153

EP - 167

JO - Philosophical Explorations

JF - Philosophical Explorations

IS - 2

ER -