Other minds embodied

Søren Overgaard

doi:10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

Other minds embodied

Søren Overgaard

Department of Communication

5 Citations (Scopus)

89 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.

Original language	English
Journal	Continental Philosophy Review
Volume	50
Issue number	1
Pages (from-to)	65-80
Number of pages	16
ISSN	1387-2842
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y
Publication status	Published - 1 Mar 2017

Keywords

Faculty of Humanities
body
embodiment
other minds
Merleau-Ponty

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10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

other minds embodied CURISAccepted author manuscript, 793 KBLicence: Unspecified

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Cite this

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AB - I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - body

KW - embodiment

KW - other minds

KW - Merleau-Ponty

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DO - 10.1007/s11007-016-9388-y

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JO - Continental Philosophy Review

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IS - 1

ER -

Other minds embodied

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Keywords

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