Abstract
I distinguish three kinds of other minds problems—conceptual, epistemological and empirical. I argue that while Merleau-Ponty believes embodiment helps with tackling the conceptual and epistemological problems, he suggests that it is of no clear use in solving (an important variant of) the empirical problem. I sketch some considerations that could lend support to Merleau-Ponty’s claims about the conceptual and epistemological problems, without claiming that these are conclusive. I then proceed to argue that Merleau-Ponty’s take on the empirical problem is essentially correct.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Continental Philosophy Review |
Vol/bind | 50 |
Udgave nummer | 1 |
Sider (fra-til) | 65-80 |
Antal sider | 16 |
ISSN | 1387-2842 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1 mar. 2017 |
Emneord
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet