Labor Supply of Politicians

Raymond Fisman; Nikolaj Arpe Harmon; Emir Kamenica; Inger Munk

doi:10.1111/jeea.12141

Labor Supply of Politicians

Raymond Fisman, Nikolaj Arpe Harmon, Emir Kamenica, Inger Munk

35 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of the European Economic Association
Volume	13
Issue number	5
Pages (from-to)	871-905
ISSN	1542-4766
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12141
Publication status	Published - 1 Oct 2015

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author = "Raymond Fisman and Harmon, {Nikolaj Arpe} and Emir Kamenica and Inger Munk",

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Labor Supply of Politicians

Abstract

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