Labor Supply of Politicians

Raymond Fisman, Nikolaj Arpe Harmon, Emir Kamenica, Inger Munk

    35 Citationer (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.

    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftJournal of the European Economic Association
    Vol/bind13
    Udgave nummer5
    Sider (fra-til)871-905
    ISSN1542-4766
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 1 okt. 2015

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