Abstract
Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Journal of the European Economic Association |
Vol/bind | 13 |
Udgave nummer | 5 |
Sider (fra-til) | 871-905 |
ISSN | 1542-4766 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1 okt. 2015 |