Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

Charles Bellemare; Alexander Sebald; Sigrid Suetens

doi:10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2

Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

Charles Bellemare, Alexander Sebald^*, Sigrid Suetens

^*Corresponding author for this work

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.

Original language	English
Journal	Experimental Economics
Volume	21
Issue number	2
Pages (from-to)	316-336
Number of pages	21
ISSN	1386-4157
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2018

Keywords

Dictator game
Guilt sensitivity
Heterogeneity
Psychological game theory
Stakes

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abstract = "Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.",

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T1 - Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

AU - Bellemare, Charles

AU - Sebald, Alexander

AU - Suetens, Sigrid

PY - 2018/6/1

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N2 - Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.

AB - Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.

KW - Dictator game

KW - Guilt sensitivity

KW - Heterogeneity

KW - Psychological game theory

KW - Stakes

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2

DO - 10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2

M3 - Journal article

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VL - 21

SP - 316

EP - 336

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

Abstract

Keywords

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