Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

TY - JOUR

T1 - Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects

AU - Bellemare, Charles

AU - Sebald, Alexander

AU - Suetens, Sigrid

PY - 2018/6/1

Y1 - 2018/6/1

N2 - Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.

AB - Psychological games of guilt aversion assume that preferences depend on (beliefs about) beliefs and on the guilt sensitivity of the decision-maker. We present an experiment designed to measure guilt sensitivities at the individual level for various stake sizes. We use the data to estimate a structural choice model that allows for heterogeneity, and permits that guilt sensitivities depend on stake size. We find substantial heterogeneity of guilt sensitivities in our population, with 60% of decision makers displaying stake-dependent guilt sensitivity. For these decision makers, we find that average guilt sensitivities are significantly different from zero for all stakes considered, while significantly decreasing with the level of stakes.

KW - Dictator game

KW - Guilt sensitivity

KW - Heterogeneity

KW - Psychological game theory

KW - Stakes

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2

DO - 10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1386-4157

VL - 21

SP - 316

EP - 336

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

IS - 2

ER -