Abstract
The paper investigates law compliance in case of on-farm timber extraction in Ghana. It empirically investigates compliance with rules that (i) require timber operators to obtain prior and informed consent from the farmers, (ii) require timber operators to pay appropriate and timely compensation for crop damage caused by timber extraction and (iii) ban chainsaw lumbering. The study documents a low level of compliance in all three domains. Subsequently, the paper discusses the underlying causes for the observed low compliance. The low compliance level is attributed to a legislation, and enforcement, that provides huge financial incentives for non-compliance for both farmers and timber operators, and in the latter case both with and without legal permits. At the same time the regulation is perceived to violate their moral values. The paper underlines the interests of the political elite as decisive in shaping the current regulation and the way it is implemented on the ground. It asserts that eliciting compliance requires consideration of both the instrumental and normative perspectives; else it becomes illusive. The study thus challenges the typical response of governments in developing countries, who, supported by donor agencies, attempt to elicit compliance through enhanced law enforcement efforts. The results presented on the Ghana case suggest that such an approach is unlikely to elicit compliance.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Environmental Management |
| Volume | 92 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 575-586 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISSN | 0301-4797 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2011 |