Forecasters' Objectives and Strategies

Iván Marinovic, Marco Ottaviani, Peter Norman Sørensen

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter develops a unified modeling framework for analyzing the strategic
behavior of forecasters. The theoretical model encompasses reputational objectives,
competition for the best accuracy, and bias. Also drawing from the extensive lit-
erature on analysts, we review the empirical evidence on strategic forecasting and
illustrate how our model can be structurally estimated.
Translated title of the contributionMålsætninger og strategier hos fremskrivere
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHandbook of Economic Forecasting
EditorsGraham Elliott, Allan Timmermann
Volume2B
PublisherNorth-Holland
Publication date2013
Pages689–720
Chapter12
ISBN (Print)978-0-444-62731-5
ISBN (Electronic)9780444627407
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
SeriesHandbooks in Economics
ISSN0169-7218

Keywords

  • Faculty of Social Sciences
  • Reputational cheap talk
  • Forecasting contest
  • Herding
  • Exaggeration
  • bias

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