n-person non-convex bargaining: efficient proportional solutions

Jens Leth Hougaard, Mich Tvede

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

Original languageEnglish
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume38
Issue number6
Pages (from-to)536-538
Number of pages3
ISSN0167-6377
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2010

Keywords

  • Former LIFE faculty

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