n-person non-convex bargaining: efficient proportional solutions

Jens Leth Hougaard, Mich Tvede

4 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftOperations Research Letters
Vol/bind38
Udgave nummer6
Sider (fra-til)536-538
Antal sider3
ISSN0167-6377
DOI
StatusUdgivet - nov. 2010

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