Abstract
The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Nonrevealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that candidates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Pages (from-to) | 702-723 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| ISSN | 1097-3923 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2015 |