Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality

TY - JOUR

T1 - Elections, Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality

AU - Jensen, Thomas

PY - 2015/10/1

Y1 - 2015/10/1

N2 - The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Nonrevealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that candidates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.

AB - The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state-dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office-motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Nonrevealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that candidates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state-dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.

U2 - 10.1111/jpet.12097

DO - 10.1111/jpet.12097

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1097-3923

VL - 17

SP - 702

EP - 723

JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory

IS - 5

ER -