Abstract
Compared with a conventional tax-transfer system, individual welfare accounts can redistribute lifetime incomes at a lower efficiency cost. These welfare accounts employ mandatory contributions rather than taxes to finance social transfers to people of working age. We describe a design for welfare accounts that guarantees a Pareto improvement if behavioural responses to the accounts improve the public budget. We also develop a formula for quantifying the impact of welfare accounts on the government budget and economic efficiency. Applying the formula to Danish data, we find that the proposed welfare accounts would generate a Pareto improvement, thus improving the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We discuss how the gains from welfare accounts can be distributed in an equitable manner.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Fiscal Studies |
Volume | 33 |
Issue number | 1 |
Pages (from-to) | 1-37 |
Number of pages | 37 |
ISSN | 0143-5671 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2012 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Social Sciences