Abstract
Compared with a conventional tax-transfer system, individual welfare accounts can redistribute lifetime incomes at a lower efficiency cost. These welfare accounts employ mandatory contributions rather than taxes to finance social transfers to people of working age. We describe a design for welfare accounts that guarantees a Pareto improvement if behavioural responses to the accounts improve the public budget. We also develop a formula for quantifying the impact of welfare accounts on the government budget and economic efficiency. Applying the formula to Danish data, we find that the proposed welfare accounts would generate a Pareto improvement, thus improving the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We discuss how the gains from welfare accounts can be distributed in an equitable manner.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Fiscal Studies |
Vol/bind | 33 |
Udgave nummer | 1 |
Sider (fra-til) | 1-37 |
Antal sider | 37 |
ISSN | 0143-5671 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - mar. 2012 |
Emneord
- Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
- social insurance
- welfare accounts
- lifetime income distribution