Deprivation as un-experienced harm?: A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm

Külli Keerus; Mickey Gjerris; Helena Röcklinsberg

doi:10.1163/15685306-12341467

Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm

Külli Keerus, Mickey Gjerris, Helena Röcklinsberg

Section for Consumption, Bioethics and Governance

Abstract

Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.

Original language	English
Journal	Society and Animals
Volume	27
Issue number	5-6
Pages (from-to)	469–486
Number of pages	18
ISSN	1063-1119
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1163/15685306-12341467
Publication status	Published - 2019

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title = "Deprivation as un-experienced harm?: A critical analysis of Tom Regan{\textquoteright}s principle of harm",

abstract = "Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan{\textquoteright}s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan{\textquoteright}s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan{\textquoteright}s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan{\textquoteright}s own possible argumentative mistakes.",

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AU - Keerus, Külli

AU - Gjerris, Mickey

AU - Röcklinsberg, Helena

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.

AB - Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.

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DO - 10.1163/15685306-12341467

M3 - Journal article

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VL - 27

SP - 469

EP - 486

JO - Society and Animals

JF - Society and Animals

IS - 5-6

ER -

Deprivation as un-experienced harm? A critical analysis of Tom Regan’s principle of harm

Abstract

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