Abstract
Political compromise is akin to toleration, since both consist of an "agreement to disagree." Compromise and toleration also share a predicament of being regarded as ambiguous virtues that require of us to accept something we actually regard as wrong. However, we misunderstand the nature, justification, and limits of compromise if we see it merely as a matter of toleration. While toleration is mainly a matter of accepting citizens' equal right to co-existence as subjects to law, political compromise includes the parties in making law – it makes them co-authors of law. Toleration entails respecting the plurality of conceptions of the good in society, whereas political compromise embodies the disagreements in coercive laws. This difference between toleration and compromise has two important consequences. First, political compromise is justified in a different manner than is toleration. The justification of compromise goes beyond, even if it includes, respect for each individual's right to determine her own conception of the good to an idea of respect for citizens as co-legislators. Second, the limits of compromise are not the same as the limits of toleration. The conditions for being included in compromise are more stringent than those for being tolerated. Still, the limits of compromise cannot be drawn to narrowly if it is to remain its value as a form of agreement that respects and embodies the differences of opinion in society.
Original language | English |
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Publication date | 29 Oct 2015 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Publication status | Published - 29 Oct 2015 |
Event | Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab - Hotel Koldingfjord, Kolding, Denmark Duration: 29 Oct 2015 → 30 Oct 2015 |
Conference
Conference | Dansk Selskab for Statskundskab |
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Location | Hotel Koldingfjord |
Country/Territory | Denmark |
City | Kolding |
Period | 29/10/2015 → 30/10/2015 |