Abstract
In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
| Volume | 144 |
| Pages (from-to) | 204-218 |
| ISSN | 0167-2681 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2017 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Social Sciences
- Political selection
- Pro-social behavior
- Social dilemma
- Corruption
- Voting
- C92
- C91
- D03
- D72
- H41