Choosing a public-spirited leader: An experimental investigation of political selection

TY - JOUR

T1 - Choosing a public-spirited leader

T2 - An experimental investigation of political selection

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Tyran, Jean-robert

PY - 2017/12/1

Y1 - 2017/12/1

N2 - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

AB - In this experiment, voters select a leader who can either act in the public interest, i.e. make efficient and equitable policy choices, or act in a corrupt way, i.e. use public funds for private gain. Voters can observe candidates⿿ pro-social behavior and their score in a cognitive ability test prior to the election, and this fact is known to candidates. Therefore, self-interested candidates have incentives to act in a pro-social manner, i.e. to pretend to be public-spirited leaders. We find that both truly pro-social and egoistic leaders co-exist, but that political selection is ineffective in choosing public-spirited leaders. The main reason is that egoistic candidates strategically pretend to be pro-social to increase their chances of winning the election.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Political selection

KW - Pro-social behavior

KW - Social dilemma

KW - Corruption

KW - Voting

KW - C92

KW - C91

KW - D03

KW - D72

KW - H41

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.006

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0167-2681

VL - 144

SP - 204

EP - 218

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

ER -