Regulating fisheries under uncertainty

Lars Gårn Hansen; Frank Jensen

doi:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.08.001

Regulating fisheries under uncertainty

Lars Gårn Hansen, Frank Jensen

Sektion for Miljø og Naturressourcer

2 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Regulator uncertainty is decisive for whether price or quantity regulation maximizes welfare in fisheries. In this paper, we develop a model of fisheries regulation that includes ecological uncertainly, variable economic uncertainty as well as structural economic uncertainty. We aggregate the effects of these uncertainties into a single welfare measure for comparing tax and quota regulation. It is shown that quotas are always preferred to fees when structural economic uncertainty dominates. Since most regulators are subject to this kind of uncertainty, this result is a potentially important qualification of the pro-price regulation message dominating the fisheries economics literature. We also believe that the model of a fishery developed in this paper could be applied to the regulation of other renewable resources where regulators are subject to uncertainty either directly or with some modification.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Resource and Energy Economics
Vol/bind	50
Sider (fra-til)	164-177
Antal sider	14
ISSN	0928-7655
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.08.001
Status	Udgivet - nov. 2017

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AU - Jensen, Frank

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AB - Regulator uncertainty is decisive for whether price or quantity regulation maximizes welfare in fisheries. In this paper, we develop a model of fisheries regulation that includes ecological uncertainly, variable economic uncertainty as well as structural economic uncertainty. We aggregate the effects of these uncertainties into a single welfare measure for comparing tax and quota regulation. It is shown that quotas are always preferred to fees when structural economic uncertainty dominates. Since most regulators are subject to this kind of uncertainty, this result is a potentially important qualification of the pro-price regulation message dominating the fisheries economics literature. We also believe that the model of a fishery developed in this paper could be applied to the regulation of other renewable resources where regulators are subject to uncertainty either directly or with some modification.

U2 - 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.08.001

DO - 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.08.001

M3 - Journal article

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VL - 50

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EP - 177

JO - Resource and Energy Economics

JF - Resource and Energy Economics

ER -

Regulating fisheries under uncertainty

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