Abstract
In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas
under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximizing industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.
under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximizing industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Resource and Energy Economics |
| Vol/bind | 35 |
| Udgave nummer | 2 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 135-147 |
| Antal sider | 13 |
| ISSN | 0928-7655 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - maj 2013 |