How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise

TY - JOUR

T1 - How moral disagreement may ground principled moral compromise

AU - Kappel, Klemens

PY - 2018/2/1

Y1 - 2018/2/1

N2 - In an influential article, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise (May, 2005). While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability, there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the article is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise.

AB - In an influential article, Simon C. May forcefully argued that, properly understood, there can never be principled reasons for moral compromise (May, 2005). While there may be pragmatic reasons for compromising that involve, for instance, concern for political expediency or for stability, there are properly speaking no principled reasons to compromise. My aim in the article is to show how principled moral compromise in the context of moral disagreements over policy options is possible. I argue that when we disagree, principled reasons favoring compromises or compromising can assume a more significant part of what makes a position all things considered best, and in this way disagreement can ground moral compromise.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - compromise

KW - moral compromise

KW - principled compromise

KW - disagreement

KW - moral disagreement

U2 - 10.1177/1470594x17729132

DO - 10.1177/1470594x17729132

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1470-594X

VL - 17

SP - 75

EP - 96

JO - Politics, Philosophy & Economics

JF - Politics, Philosophy & Economics

IS - 1

ER -