Abstract
In this paper I examine the prospects for a rights-based approach to the morality of pure risk-imposition. In particular, I discuss a practical challenge to proponents of the thesis that we have a right against being imposed a risk of harm. According to an influential criticism, a right against risk-imposition will rule out all ordinary activities. The paper examines two strategies that rights theorists may follow in response to this “Paralysis Problem”. The first strategy introduces a threshold for when a risk-imposition is a rights violation. The second strategy drops the claim that rights are absolute and maintains that all rights infringements generate compensation duties. It is argued that both strategies face significant practical problems of their own and that the Paralysis Problem seems fatal for a right against risk-imposition in the absence of an adequate account of the morally relevant threshold risk.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
| Vol/bind | 19 |
| Udgave nummer | 4 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 917-930 |
| Antal sider | 14 |
| ISSN | 1386-2820 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 1 aug. 2016 |
Emneord
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet