What binds us together: Normativity and the Second Person

TY - JOUR

T1 - What binds us together

T2 - Normativity and the Second Person

AU - Satne, Glenda Lucila

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Even if it appears quite evident that we live within society and as a consequence are bound together by shared norms and institutions, the nature of this relationship is a source of philosophical perplexity. After discussing the conditions of adequacy a conception of shared norms must accommodate, I discuss communitarian and interpretationist accounts of shared norms. I claim that they are problematic insofar as they fail to provide an adequate conception of the shared and binding character of social norms. Finally, I argue that a different understanding of the shared character of norms follows from a correct understanding of the conditions of adequacy at stake.

AB - Even if it appears quite evident that we live within society and as a consequence are bound together by shared norms and institutions, the nature of this relationship is a source of philosophical perplexity. After discussing the conditions of adequacy a conception of shared norms must accommodate, I discuss communitarian and interpretationist accounts of shared norms. I claim that they are problematic insofar as they fail to provide an adequate conception of the shared and binding character of social norms. Finally, I argue that a different understanding of the shared character of norms follows from a correct understanding of the conditions of adequacy at stake.

U2 - 10.5840/philtopics20144213

DO - 10.5840/philtopics20144213

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0276-2080

VL - 42

SP - 43

EP - 61

JO - Philosophical Topics

JF - Philosophical Topics

IS - 1

ER -