Visual perception from the perspective of a representational, non-reductionistic, level-dependent account of perception and conscious awareness

TY - JOUR

T1 - Visual perception from the perspective of a representational, non-reductionistic, level-dependent account of perception and conscious awareness

AU - Overgaard, Morten

AU - Mogensen, Jesper

PY - 2014/5/5

Y1 - 2014/5/5

N2 - This article proposes a new model to interpret seemingly conflicting evidence concerning the correlation of consciousness and neural processes. Based on an analysis of research of blindsight and subliminal perception, the reorganization of elementary functions and consciousness framework suggests that mental representations consist of functions at several different levels of analysis, including truly localized perceptual elementary functions and perceptual algorithmic modules, which are interconnections of the elementary functions. We suggest that conscious content relates to the 'top level' of analysis in a 'situational algorithmic strategy' that reflects the general state of an individual. We argue that conscious experience is intrinsically related to representations that are available to guide behaviour. From this perspective, we find that blindsight and subliminal perception can be explained partly by too coarse-grained methodology, and partly by top-down enhancing of representations that normally would not be relevant to action.

AB - This article proposes a new model to interpret seemingly conflicting evidence concerning the correlation of consciousness and neural processes. Based on an analysis of research of blindsight and subliminal perception, the reorganization of elementary functions and consciousness framework suggests that mental representations consist of functions at several different levels of analysis, including truly localized perceptual elementary functions and perceptual algorithmic modules, which are interconnections of the elementary functions. We suggest that conscious content relates to the 'top level' of analysis in a 'situational algorithmic strategy' that reflects the general state of an individual. We argue that conscious experience is intrinsically related to representations that are available to guide behaviour. From this perspective, we find that blindsight and subliminal perception can be explained partly by too coarse-grained methodology, and partly by top-down enhancing of representations that normally would not be relevant to action.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - hjerne

KW - hjernens plasticitet

KW - hjerneskade

KW - hjerneskade - brain damage

KW - bevidsthed

KW - visuel cognition

KW - REF-modellen

KW - REFCON-modellen

KW - blindsight

U2 - 10.1098/rstb.2013.0209

DO - 10.1098/rstb.2013.0209

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 24639581

SN - 0962-8436

VL - 369

SP - 1

EP - 12

JO - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

JF - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

IS - 1641

M1 - 20130209

ER -