Vindicating Husserl's Primal I

Abstract

This paper explores the complex answer to the question of whether the self is prior to the Other or the Other is prior to the self in Husserl’s phenomenology. Contrary to standard accounts of Husserl’s presumptive solipsism, this paper demonstrates how Husserl understands the self and the Other as essentially related while at the same time developing a notion of the primal ego. Informative and critical comparisons with Merleau-Ponty and Scheler are also developed in a defense of Husserl’s notion of the primal ego.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhenomenology in a New Key : Between Analysis and History
EditorsJeffrey Bloechl, Nicolas de Warren
Number of pages15
PublisherSpringer Science+Business Media
Publication date2015
Pages1-14
ISBN (Print)9783319020174
ISBN (Electronic)9783319020181
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
SeriesContributions to Phenomenology
Volume72
ISSN0923-9545

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