Unity of consciousness and the problem of self

TY - CHAP

T1 - Unity of consciousness and the problem of self

AU - Zahavi, Dan

PY - 2011/5/2

Y1 - 2011/5/2

N2 - This article argues in defence of the minimal self and discusses the phenomenological objection to the Buddhist noself view. It considers the distinction made by Miri Albahari between two forms of the sense of body ownership: personal ownership and perspectival ownership. It suggests that there is an important contrast between this Buddhist conception and the phenomenological conception of nonegological consciousness as found by Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre.

AB - This article argues in defence of the minimal self and discusses the phenomenological objection to the Buddhist noself view. It considers the distinction made by Miri Albahari between two forms of the sense of body ownership: personal ownership and perspectival ownership. It suggests that there is an important contrast between this Buddhist conception and the phenomenological conception of nonegological consciousness as found by Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre.

M3 - Book chapter

SP - 316

EP - 335

BT - The Oxford Handbook of the Self

A2 - Gallagher, Shaun

PB - Oxford University Press

ER -