“Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”

TY - JOUR

T1 - “Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”

AU - Emmanuel, Nikolas George

PY - 2010/10

Y1 - 2010/10

N2 - This study extends the debate concerning the feasibility of using foreignassistance to leverage political reforms in developing countries. This researchcombines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an effort toexpand on the work done by previous scholars. Conclusions of the empiricalanalysis point to the finding that political conditionality is most effectivewhen close cooperation exists between donors. This coordination, however,is frequently sabotaged by self-interested donor-patrons, illustrated by thecase of Cameroon and France. This pattern is generalizable and significantlyundermines the overall success rate of a political conditionality approach.

AB - This study extends the debate concerning the feasibility of using foreignassistance to leverage political reforms in developing countries. This researchcombines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an effort toexpand on the work done by previous scholars. Conclusions of the empiricalanalysis point to the finding that political conditionality is most effectivewhen close cooperation exists between donors. This coordination, however,is frequently sabotaged by self-interested donor-patrons, illustrated by thecase of Cameroon and France. This pattern is generalizable and significantlyundermines the overall success rate of a political conditionality approach.

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1351-0347

VL - 17

JO - Democratization

JF - Democratization

IS - 5

ER -