Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents

Mogens Fosgerau*, Robin Lindsey

*Corresponding author for this work
12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They independently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting departure time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some capacity during an incident.

Original languageEnglish
JournalRegional Science and Urban Economics
Volume43
Issue number5
Pages (from-to)764-782
Number of pages19
ISSN0166-0462
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Keywords

  • Bottleneck model
  • Congestion
  • Departure-time decisions
  • Evening commute
  • Morning commute
  • Scheduling utility
  • Traffic incidents

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