Abstract
This paper concerns local yet systematic problems of contrastive underdetermination of model choice in cognitive neuroscience debates about the so-called two visual systems hypothesis. The underdetermination problem is systematically generated by the way certain assumptions about the representationalist nature of computation are translated into experimental practice. The problem is that behavioural data underdetermine the choice between competing representational models. In this paper, I diagnose how these assumptions generate underdetermination problems in the choice between competing functional models of perception– action. Using the tools of philosophy of science, I describe the type of underdetermination and sketch a possible cure.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Synthese |
Number of pages | 24 |
ISSN | 0039-7857 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 2018 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Humanities
- Two visual systems hypothesis
- Underdetermination
- Philosophy of science
- Philosophy of cognitive neuroscience
- Model choice