The regulation of hunting: a game population based tax on hunters

Jens Abildtrup, Frank Jensen

Abstract

This paper examines a tax/subsidy on hunters based on game population. The tax/subsidy is the difference between actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference between the marginal value of the game population to the hunter and the regulator and differences in user costs of the population. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum.
Original languageEnglish
JournalRevue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement
Volume95
Issue number03
Pages (from-to)281-298
Number of pages18
ISSN1966-9607
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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