The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality

Ebbe Hendon; Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen; Birgitte Sloth

doi:10.1006/game.1996.0018

The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality

Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth

Department of Economics

Abstract

We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for extensive form games. A weak consistency condition is sufficient to obtain an analogy to the well known One-Stage-Deviation Principle for subgame perfect equilibrium

Original language	English
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	12
Issue number	2
Pages (from-to)	274-282
ISSN	0899-8256
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0018
Publication status	Published - 1996

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title = "The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality",

abstract = "We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for extensive form games. A weak consistency condition is sufficient to obtain an analogy to the well known One-Stage-Deviation Principle for subgame perfect equilibrium",

author = "Ebbe Hendon and Whitta-Jacobsen, {Hans J{\o}rgen} and Birgitte Sloth",

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T1 - The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality

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AU - Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen

AU - Sloth, Birgitte

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PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

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AB - We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for extensive form games. A weak consistency condition is sufficient to obtain an analogy to the well known One-Stage-Deviation Principle for subgame perfect equilibrium

U2 - 10.1006/game.1996.0018

DO - 10.1006/game.1996.0018

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 12

SP - 274

EP - 282

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

ER -

The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality

Abstract

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